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Abstract 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change 
mitigation through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which industrialized countries, 
in order to meet their mitigation commitments, can buy emission reduction credits from projects 
in developing countries. Before its implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, 
arguing that it would sell-off their countries’ cheapest emission reduction options and force them to 
invest in more expensive measures to meet their future reduction targets. This ‘low-hanging fruit’ 
argument is analysed empirically by comparing theoretical marginal abatement cost curves. 
Emissions abatement costs and potentials for CDM projects are estimated for different technologies 
in eight countries, using capital budgeting tools and information from project documentation. It is 
found that the CDM is not yet capturing a large portion of the identified abatement potential in 
most countries. While the costs of most emissions reduction opportunities grasped taken are below 
the average credit price, there are still plenty of available low-cost opportunities. Mexico and 
Argentina appear to use the CDM mostly for harvesting the low-hanging fruit, whereas in the 
other countries more expensive projects are accessing the CDM. This evidence at first sight 
challenges the low-hanging fruit claim, but needs to be understood in the light of the barriers for 
the adoption of low-cost abatement options. 
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1. Introduction 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol, developing countries can voluntarily participate in climate change mitigation 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Emission reduction credits - Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) - from projects in developing countries can be bought by 
industrialized ones1, who use them to meet their own reduction commitments. While its main goal 
is ensuring cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures, the second aim of the CDM is to benefit host 
developing countries through technology transfer and investments in sustainable development, thus 
contributing to their transition to a more climate-friendly economy.  
 
Before full-scale implementation, developing-country experts opposed the CDM, arguing that using 
it would imply selling off developing countries’ cheap emission reduction options (the so-called 
‘low-hanging fruit’) to industrialized countries, with the result that developing countries would 
have to invest in more expensive measures to meet their own future reduction targets.2 While the 
CDM is a cost-containment mechanism and as such is supposed to target the cheap emission 
reduction options, the low-hanging fruit focus of the CDM has also been criticized from a 
developed-country perspective, on the grounds that the subsidy granted by the mechanism to very 
large, low-cost projects is disproportionately large compared to the cost of implementing the 
emission reductions (Wara, 2006). Despite these concerns and criticisms, the CDM has grown 
successfully, even in the countries initially most sceptical of it e.g. China (see Tangen and 
Heggelund, 2003; Bang et al., 2005). As of December 2009, over 5000 projects have been proposed 
and 1.1 billion tonnes CO2e of emission reductions are expected to be achieved by 2012 (URC, 
2010). For the last three years, monthly project inflows averaged more than 100 and have not been 
touched by the financial crisis to date. 
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These arguments are likely to play an important role in the international negotiations towards a 
new climate regime post-2012. There is considerable pressure on fast-growing developing countries 
to take up some kind of emission reduction commitments. Firstly, it is now recognized that future 
global emissions reduction targets need to be much more ambitious than the Kyoto target for 
avoiding dangerous climate change. Secondly, some large and fast-growing developing countries 
already emit such high levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) that their participation is regarded as 
crucial for avoiding dangerous climate change (Bang et al., 2005; Gupta et al., 2007; Höhne et al., 
2007; Parry et al., 2007; WRI, 2008).3 Thirdly, concerns about the impacts of climate policy - on a 
country’s competitiveness in the global markets and the likelihood that energy-intensive industries 
migrate to countries without emission reduction targets - have been prominent in research and 
policy debates (see e.g. Hourcade et al., 2001; Baumert and Kete, 2002; Cosbey, 2005; Barker et al., 
2007; High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment, 2007). All these 
concerns have led to increasing demands by industrialized countries that advanced developing 
countries take up emission reduction commitments.  
 
Developing countries, however, oppose committing to reduction targets. Their main arguments are 
the historical responsibility of industrialized countries for existing carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere; the negative impact that reduction targets might have on their development, poverty 
alleviation and growth expectations; and notions of fairness in the amount of emissions a person is 
allowed to generate in developing countries as compared to industrialized ones. For detailed 
accounts of different countries’ positions in the international negotiations towards new climate 
commitments, see Bang et al. (2005) and, more recently, Höhne et al. (2007) and WRI (2009). 
 
The CDM experience is playing a role in the climate negotiations as well. Some developing 
countries and environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) consider the CDM to be a 
means for industrialized countries to shift their emissions reduction responsibility to other 
countries. Based on its project-by-project nature, critics argue that it creates disincentives for 
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developing countries’ governments to pass climate-friendly legislation.4 Due to the large financial 
flows achieved by the CDM, industrialized countries feel uncomfortable that the desire to continue 
receiving these funds is itself a reason for advanced developing countries not to take more 
ambitious climate change mitigation actions (EU Commission, 2009; US Government 
Accountability Office, 2008). Moreover, the costs of mitigation actions, coupled with the above-
mentioned fear that the CDM has already captured the cheapest ones, make developing countries 
even more unwilling to commit. 
 
This argument is empirically tested, thus contributing to the discussion on the role of offset 
mechanisms in achieving global GHG emission reductions. So far, most of the research on the low-
hanging fruit claim has been theoretical and model-based, and thus no empirical evidence for its 
validity has yet been presented. With the large number of CDM projects in the current portfolio, 
this is now possible. 
 
The existing literature on the low-hanging fruit claim is first reviewed. The approach for testing 
this claim using marginal abatement cost curves is then detailed and the emissions abatement cost of 
CDM projects using the financial information provided in their Project Design Documents (PDDs) 
is estimated. A dataset of projects, technologies, estimated costs and expected amount of emission 
reductions is built for eight CDM host countries and summarized in the form of CDM-specific 
abatement cost curves. These curves are compared with existing abatement cost curves from the 
literature, in order to determine whether only or mostly the cheapest abatement options are being 
captured by the CDM. Conclusions for the CDM, the low-hanging fruit argument and its relevance 
for the ongoing climate negotiations follow.  
 
2. Literature review  
The low-hanging fruit issue – also known as the ‘sold-out’ hypothesis, the ‘cherry-picking’ or the 
‘cream-skimming’ problem – was already a discussion topic during the negotiations that led to the 
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implementation of the CDM. It is the claim that developing countries will be worse off after selling 
their cheapest abatement options (the low-hanging fruits) to industrialized countries through the 
CDM, because they will have to invest in more expensive options later, when they assume own 
emission reduction targets. 
 
So far, only theoretical analyses of the low-hanging fruit problem have been available in the 
literature. The results of the studies by Olsen and Painuly (2002), Akita (2003), Bréchet et al. (2004), 
Germain et al. (2007) and Narain and van’t Veld (2008) imply that the existence of a low-hanging-
fruit problem basically depends on the evolution of carbon credit prices, the way in which future 
abatement commitments for developing countries are set, whether CDM projects are developed 
unilaterally or bilaterally, the market power of the participating countries and the possibility to 
bank credits from one commitment period to the next.  
 
But several more general characteristics of the climate regime give shape to this interpretation. 
First, it assumes a necessary condition that developing countries, especially the more advanced 
ones, will eventually ‘graduate’ and commit to their own GHG emission reduction targets (Akita, 
2003). This is at present one of the most controversial debate topics in the international 
negotiations towards a post-Kyoto agreement. While Kyoto presupposes such a transition and 
industrialized countries are trying to push for it, the existing rules do not explicitly include it, and 
most developing countries are currently against it. 
 
Second, the availability of CDM project options is not only influenced by the cost of the abatement 
measures, but is also constrained by financial, technical and institutional barriers in the host 
countries and by the CDM rules themselves. In particular, the high CDM transaction costs and 
cumbersome registration procedures may prevent attractive abatement options from accessing the 
mechanism (especially if they are small-scale). While this situation is expected to improve with new 
CDM modalities, it is likely that some of these cheap abatement options will contribute to the host 
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country’s own reduction targets in the future. This also applies to project types that are currently 
not accepted in the CDM, such as avoided deforestation and many other land use change projects, 
and the use of nuclear energy. Further, only those projects considered ‘additional’ can be registered 
as a CDM. If currently expensive mitigation options become cheaper, they might no longer fulfil 
the additionality criterion – if one uses low-hanging fruit terminology, the fruit starts to ‘rot’.  
 
Furthermore, new emissions abatement options may appear and become cheaper in time as 
technology evolves and as economies grow. The pool of abatement options is thus not a static one 
but may grow in the future, especially in developing countries.  
 
Finally, there is an international market for carbon reduction certificates. Assuming a continuation 
of the current regime, even after a country graduates, there will be other developing countries still 
under the CDM system, which may continue to deliver cheaper carbon credits (Narain and van’t 
Veld, 2008). Similarly, as abatement options in some countries become scarce or more expensive, 
other countries now under-represented in the CDM will become more mature and enter the 
market more actively. 
 
 
3. The low-hanging fruit issue 
To model the low-hanging fruit issue, Rose et al. (1999) draw on the theory of resource exhaustion, 
whereby there is a resource stock (carbon emission mitigation options) that is exploited and 
gradually depleted, which results in rising costs of implementation for emission mitigation projects 
over time. This approach is followed here and it is assumed that part of the stock of emission 
reduction options in developing countries is captured by the CDM. By comparing the complete 
stock to the portion captured by the CDM, conclusions are drawn on whether the low-hanging 
fruit argument holds. 
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This approach implies a strong simplification of reality, as it does not take into account the carbon 
market dynamics that, according to the literature, influences the availability of emission reduction 
options. Both emissions trading and banking – the possibility to save carbon credits earned today 
for using them in a future period – relax the problem of exhaustion of emission reduction options, 
as they increase flexibility in achieving reduction targets. Economic growth and technological 
change will make new emission reduction options appear, so that the abatement stock is 
replenished. Learning effects and technology diffusion will make these new emission reduction 
options become cheaper in time, so that there will be new low-hanging fruits to pick.  
 
However, at a given moment in time, it can be assumed that the stock of abatement options 
available is fixed. As a result, our test of the low-hanging fruit problem relies on two hypotheses: 
- Size hypothesis: The larger the portion of the country’s mitigation potential (measured in 
tCO2e) that has been captured by the CDM, the more likely there is a low-hanging fruit 
problem. 
- Cost hypothesis: The larger the portion of the country’s cheap emission reduction options 
that has been captured by the CDM (measured in tCO2e), the more likely there is a low-
hanging fruit problem. 
If the CDM is not exhausting the stock of abatement options under the extreme assumption of no 
dynamics, the actual situation must be even better, because the stock will grow in the future. Thus, 
this assumption leads us to a strong, robust conclusion. 
 
Our conceptualization of ‘cheap emission reduction options’ relies on the carbon market: ‘cheap’ is 
defined as all those emission reduction options whose abatement costs are below the average carbon 
market price for CERs. This is in line with the notion that the market will influence the choice of 
emission reduction actions: if the market price does not compensate for the cost of mitigation, then 
it is not financially attractive to engage in this action, and it is preferable to trade carbon credits in 
the market.  
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4. Marginal abatement cost curves 
The discussion on the low-hanging fruit issue builds on the interaction between GHG emissions 
abatement costs and potentials. Abatement costs describe the costs society has to bear to reduce one 
tonne of CO2 emissions – or the equivalent amount of other greenhouse gases – using a certain 
mitigation activity. They determine the cost-effectiveness of individual policy or project choices. 
Abatement potentials – the volume of emissions reductions that can be achieved by applying a 
specific technology in a specific region or country in a certain period of time – describe the amount 
of mitigation that is feasible. Costs and potentials for different technologies in a country or region 
are usually displayed graphically together to form a marginal abatement cost curve (MAC).  
 
MAC curves are used extensively in environmental economics to link a firm’s (or a country’s) 
pollutant emission levels and the cost of each additional unit of pollution reduction (McKitrick, 
1999). Examples of the use of MACs at the firm and at the country level can be found in McKitrick 
(1999), Ellerman and Decaux (1998) and Criqui et al. (1999). MAC curves for climate mitigation can 
be derived using a top-down approach by means of macroeconomic models with a detailed energy 
sector component. They can also be obtained on the basis of engineering data of emission reduction 
technologies using a bottom-up approach (Criqui et al., 1999).  
 
Climate-economy models use these curves systematically (see e.g. Kuik et al., 2009, for a meta-
analysis). However, abatement cost estimates are frequently based on expert opinion, or on model 
assumptions regarding, among others, the climate policy target, the emissions baseline, discounting 
rates, and future technological options. Further, there are only a few abatement cost and potential 
studies that focus on developing countries. Two good examples are the efforts by Wetzelaer et al. 
(2007) and Bakker et al. (2007) to build an abatement cost curve for these countries in the years 
2010 and 2020, respectively. Recently, the consultancy McKinsey has started to develop global and 
country-specific MAC curves for the year 2030, which have eagerly been taken up in the 
9 
 
international climate policy debate (see Enkvist et al. 2007 for an overview). However, as the 
assumptions and methodology used in the McKinsey curves are not publicly accessible, in this 
study only bottom-up MAC curves and abatement cost and potential estimations, with more 
transparent assumptions that are easier to control for and discuss, were used.  
 
Still, a drawback of the reliance on abatement cost curves is that they usually only include the 
direct investment and operation costs of the abatement options, overlooking potential information 
and transaction costs that can make them much more difficult to implement in practice. 
 
5. Data and methods 
 
5.1 CDM cost data 
CDM project information is available from a public database, the CDM pipeline, which is updated 
monthly by the UNEP Risoe Centre (URC, 2010). More specific information for each project is 
also available in the project documentation that can be downloaded from the UNFCCC website.5 
This documentation often includes a financial analysis, as this is one possible method for 
demonstrating that a project complies with the CDM requirement of additionality: if the analysis 
shows that the project needs the subsidy from the CDM to be financially attractive, then it is 
deemed additional. The alternative method for demonstrating additionality is a barrier analysis: if 
the proponent demonstrates convincingly that there are substantive barriers that prevent the 
project from taking place without CDM support (such as technological barriers or difficulties in 
accessing financing), then the project is considered additional.  
 
While this is the only CDM-specific source of financial data that is easily available for compiling a 
comprehensive dataset, there is a risk of selection bias because information comes only from those 
projects choosing to use a financial analysis for additionality demonstration. Indeed, one could 
think that it is precisely the projects using the barrier analysis which are the low-hanging fruits, and 
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that they do not present their financial data because they are so cheap that they would not pass the 
additionality test if they did. This suspicion is shared by the CDM regulators, as can be seen in the 
proposal by the CDM Methodology Panel to enhance the barrier test for projects that are likely to 
have high revenues (CDM Methodology Panel, 2008) and in the recently adopted ‘Guidelines for 
objective demonstration and assessment of barriers’ (CDM Executive Board, 2009). 
 
A quick exploration of the data provided by the IGES CDM Project Database (IGES, 2010), which 
includes information on what type of financial analysis is used in each CDM project, shows that of 
all the CDM projects already registered, or seeking registration, by the end of 2009, around 35% do 
not provide any financial data in their public documentation. The factors affecting the decision to 
include a financial analysis in the CDM project documentation are, as will be discussed in detail 
below, not only the technology involved in the project, but also the size of the project, the host 
country and notably the time passed since the CDM was initiated. This leads us to believe that the 
data do not suffer from selection bias.  
 
It can be assumed that the technology involved in the project is the main determinant of the 
project’s cost such that, if the cheap technologies never provide financial information, there will be 
selection bias. In CDM projects, the technology used is roughly determined by the ‘project type’, 
which is a classification that includes both the economic sector involved (e.g. energy, agriculture, 
forestry, cement industry) and the generic technology used to reduce emissions (wind energy, 
hydro power, reforestation, energy efficiency improvements). In the IGES data, it can be seen that 
in terms of project types, only the projects reducing the industrial gas HFC-23 (a very potent 
GHG) never perform the financial analysis, which is because they are almost automatically 
considered additional, as they do not have any revenues other than the CERs. In all other project 
types (except in those that have only one or two projects registered), at least 30% of the projects 
provide some kind of financial data. Thus, for almost all project types there is some cost data 
available. This minimizes the risk of selection bias.  
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The size6 of the project is also an important variable affecting the decision to include a financial 
analysis in the documentation. Almost 80% of the large CDM projects include a financial analysis, 
while only 45% of the small ones do. This is related both to the simplified modalities for 
additionality determination that exist for small projects, and to the above-mentioned regulatory 
mistrust against the barrier test. With respect to countries, in all main CDM hosts  both projects 
with and without a financial analysis are found but there are considerable differences: in China, for 
example, over 90% of projects include some kind of financial data, while in Mexico and India only 
71% and 45%, respectively, do so. Finally, the time elapsed since the first CDM project was 
submitted for validation (December 2003) increases the likelihood that a new project includes a 
financial analysis in its documentation, and this is applicable to most project types. Indeed, as the 
CDM rules have become clearer and stricter over time, more projects have chosen to perform an 
investment analysis to demonstrate additionality. 
 
5.2 CDM-specific abatement cost calculation 
As shown in Equation 1, a project’s abatement costs is defined as the net present value of the 
project costs (investment and operation) minus its revenues (e.g. income from electricity sales), all 
divided by the amount of GHG emission reductions it expects to achieve (indicated by the amount 
of emission reduction credits the project expects to generate over its crediting lifetime, also time-
discounted)7:  
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Where C(CDM)i is the abatement cost of project i in USD/tCO2e, t the time period, n the operative 
lifetime of the project and m its crediting period (all in years); Ct and Rt the operation costs and the 
non-carbon revenues in year t, and I0 the initial investment; At is the abatement achieved by the 
project in year t (in tCO2e); and r is the discount rate. All costs are expressed in US dollars, 
calculated either using the current interbank exchange rate at the time the project was proposed, or 
using the exchange rate provided by the project developer in the documentation. This cost 
calculation approach is similar to the one used by Rahman et al. (2009) in a recent empirical study 
on the cost structure of CDM emissions abatement, but our calculations differ on the treatment of 
the annual abatement, which are discounted in order to be able to interpret abatement costs in 
constant terms (however, our main results are not affected if undiscounted emission reductions are 
used in the denominator). 
 
Time discounting is critical in cost calculations. In capital budgeting, time discounting is used to 
reflect the interest rates the project is subject to, plus any financial risks applicable to either the 
country where the investment is taking place or the type of investment being made (Brealey and 
Myers, 2000). In the CDM, discount rates are chosen by the project participant, but need to be 
justified. Still, there is a significant variation in the financial discount rates of projects in different 
technological categories and in different countries. The discount rates have been standardized for 
each country in order to have comparable information and to avoid the possible effect of discount 
rates being manipulated to obtain less attractive financial figures.8 The discount rate chosen for each 
country is the median of the discount rates utilized in the CDM projects within the sample taking 
place in the respective country, which was then rounded to the closest integer. As project 
developers have to substantiate the parameters they choose for the financial analysis, we consider 
the median to be a good indicator of the real discount rate applicable in the country. This is 
preferable to the mean, because it avoids the influence of outliers, and to the mode because in 
several countries no mode was found, and in most cases the median and the mode were identical. 
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See Appendix 1 for an overview of the standardized discount rates applied. See also Castro and 
Michaelowa (2010) for further details on the methodology used for the cost calculations. 
 
Abatement cost information was extracted from 304 CDM projects, covering 36 emission reduction 
technologies.9 These projects are mainly located in the eight host countries included in the sample 
(see below). For technologies where no sufficient financial information was found in these 
countries, the sample was extended to other countries. For the reason described above, HFC-23 
reduction projects, which contribute a large percentage of the CERs generated in advanced 
developing countries, typically lack financial data in the project documentation; thus, abatement 
cost estimations from secondary sources (Harnisch and Hendricks, 2000; Jimenez, 2005; UNEP 
TEAP, 2002) were used.  
 
The resulting abatement cost data were summarized in terms of the median abatement cost 
estimated for each technology (or CDM project type) included in the sample. 
 
5.3 Expected size of CDM emission abatement 
As an estimation of the amount of mitigation opportunities the CDM is expected to capture in a 
country, the annual amount of carbon credits that all the CDM projects currently proposed in the 
country estimate was aggregated. This information was taken from the CDM pipeline as of the end 
of December 2009 (URC, 2010). This is a rough estimation, as it does not include new projects that 
could be proposed in the future, but does include projects that have been proposed but not yet 
registered so far. Following current project proposal rates (91 projects/month10), about 1092 new 
projects will enter the CDM pipeline by the end of 2010. Following current project registration 
rates (47 projects/month10), only about 564 existing projects will be registered. As the CDM 
pipeline includes 2838 not-yet-registered projects as of the end of December 2009, our estimation is 
likely to be larger than the real size of the CDM by the end of 2010, because many projects in the 
pipeline will not yet start generating emission reduction credits (unless the registration process 
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accelerates significantly in the following months, which is unlikely). Finally, this estimation does 
not take into account the fact that the emission reductions actually achieved are – for most project 
types – less than the estimations provided in the project documentation (Castro and Michaelowa, 
2008; URC, 2010). This all implies that, for our discussion of the low-hanging fruit argument, we 
are again on the safe side: if an overestimated CDM does not capture a large proportion of the 
theoretical abatement potential, then the low-hanging fruit issue is not likely to be a real problem.11 
 
5.4 Comparison with theoretical abatement cost studies 
From the cost and the size information, marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for the CDM were 
built. In order to test the size hypothesis, these curves were compared with MAC curves showing 
the technical emissions abatement potential in the respective country. These theoretical MAC 
curves were built by merging the information from several studies that have performed bottom-up 
assessments of the technologies available for reducing GHG emissions in individual countries, their 
costs, and the amount of emission reductions that could potentially be achieved (the details of the 
studies used appear in Appendix 2). Care was taken to avoid overlaps between the different studies. 
In order to test the cost hypothesis, a more detailed analysis of the portion of the abatement 
potential captured by the CDM for different cost categories was performed.  
 
5.5 Case selection 
The low-hanging fruit argument is of interest to those developing countries under pressure to take 
more action to mitigate climate change. Action towards climate change mitigation is subject to the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ of countries 
(UNFCCC, 2008, p.3), which means that countries with more responsibility for causing climate 
change and with better capabilities to take action should do more. Responsibility can be measured 
in terms of GHG emissions levels, in absolute terms or per capita. Capability can be measured in 
terms of GDP per capita, which is an indication of the economic wealth of the country. Further, 
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the low-hanging fruit problem is potentially relevant only to those countries in which the CDM 
has become significant.  
 
Thus, from the countries that are hosting at least 10 registered CDM projects,  those that ranked 
highest, in terms of absolute CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita, were 
taken by building an index that incorporates these three indicators with equal weights. Data was 
obtained from IEA (2007) and IMF (2008). The resulting sample includes China, South Korea, 
Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, Argentina, Malaysia and Israel. For Malaysia and Israel it was not 
possible to collect sufficient information for building theoretical abatement cost curves, hence they 
are discarded from the analysis.12 However, they have been used for extracting CDM project cost 
information. India and Brazil, two important CDM host countries, are not covered in the sample: 
India has very low levels of emissions per capita and GDP per capita; Brazil has very low levels of 
emissions per capita and its emissions come mainly from the land use sector, which is currently not 
covered under the CDM. Chile had an index value very similar to the one of Argentina. As 
Argentina has higher absolute emissions, this country was preferred for the analysis. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 CDM abatement costs 
Figure 1 shows box plots of the estimated emissions abatement costs of the projects in the sample, 
after standardizing their financial discount rates.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
The graph shows that, even after standardizing discount rates, there is a high variability in cost 
estimations for some technologies, and thus these estimations need to be taken with care. However, 
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our results reproduce very closely the range and ranking of costs reported in abatement cost studies 
(see e.g. US EPA, 2006; Vattenfall, 2007; Wetzelaer et al., 2007): Methane and industrial gas 
reduction projects are generally cheaper than CO2 reduction projects, basically due to the higher 
global warming potential of these other gases; renewable energy projects, specifically wind, hydro 
and solar energy projects are among the costlier ones. All this is consistent with other marginal 
abatement cost curves and supports our results. The abatement costs of most of these CDM 
projects are significantly below US$ 13, which is an indication that the emission credit income at 
current primary prices will make them attractive.13 
 
The variability of costs within project subtypes stems from various factors. The impact of financial 
discount rates has already been discussed. These and other parameters (project lifetimes, inclusion 
of taxes and financing costs) can be easily manipulated to make projects appear non-attractive. 
However, there are also large differences in the technologies used within project subtypes. For 
example, methane recovery projects from wastewater can consist of a sophisticated bioreactor, or of 
a plastic membrane covering an already existing anaerobic lagoon. Biodigesters can be imported or 
can be manufactured domestically, which also has an impact on costs. Biomass projects include 
energy generation from a variety of agricultural or industrial by-products, involving different 
technologies. Energy efficiency projects take place in cement, steel, chemical, petrochemical and 
other industries and can encompass different efficiency measures. Hydroelectric projects have very 
different sizes, and smaller ones (involving the construction of a dam) typically imply higher 
abatement costs. Finally, different countries can have different cost structures, energy prices, taxes 
or financial incentives for specific technologies, which may have an impact on overall abatement 
costs.  
 
6.2 CDM abatement cost curves 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the estimated GHG abatement cost curves for the CDM of China and 
the other countries. As explained, these curves were built by taking the median abatement cost of 
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each technology (shown in Figure 1) and the amount of emission reductions expected to be 
achieved annually by all CDM projects in the pipeline as of December 2009 in the respective 
countries, also classified by technologies.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
It should be noted that these curves include project types without cost information. These appear at 
the left end of the curves, as having zero abatement costs. The projects without cost information 
represent 5.2% of the CDM abatement potential in South Korea, 2.2% in Thailand, 0.7% in Israel, 
0.1% in China and 0% in Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa. While this inclusion 
enlarges the quantity of low-cost (or zero-cost) project options, these data were not omitted from 
the curves as they allowed for a more realistic picture of the overall abatement potential. This 
enables us again to be on the cautious side of the estimations. 
 
6.3 Comparison with theoretical abatement curves: size 
Based on data reported in 18 climate mitigation studies in the countries included in the sample (see 
Appendix 2), theoretical GHG abatement cost curves were built, trying to cover as many emission 
reduction options from as many economic sectors as possible, and including CO2, methane and, 
when information was available, industrial gas emissions. In all countries, the curves were built to 
reflect the emissions reduction potential in the year 2010, which should be comparable to the 
current CDM in which a static stock of mitigation options is assumed. In the Chinese case, an 
abatement curve for the year 2020 has also been included, to provide an idea of how the emissions 
reduction potential is expected to grow in the future.  
 
The indicator of the size component of the low-hanging fruit argument is provided by the 
horizontal difference between the CDM-specific and the theoretical abatement cost curves in each 
country. This is shown in Figures 3 (a)-(f). Table 1 presents a summary of calculations regarding 
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how much of the theoretical abatement potential in each country is being captured by the CDM, 
by dividing in each case the total abatement expected from the CDM by the total theoretical 
abatement potential. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 3 and Table 1 show that, in all cases, the CDM is capturing only a portion of the estimated 
emissions reduction potential in the respective countries. In China this portion is around 32%, thus 
it could be said that there is a risk that the CDM is exhausting the stock of emission reduction 
possibilities in the country. However, as time passes, new mitigation opportunities arise, so that the 
current CDM represents only about 22% of the Chinese emission reduction potential in 2020. In 
South Korea and Argentina, the CDM has captured less than 20% of the potential identified up to 
2010, and in Mexico, South Africa and Thailand this portion is below 10%. Thus, we see that in 
most countries, the risk of a ‘low-hanging fruit issue’ is, at least in terms of the current size of the 
CDM, weak. 
 
Looking in more detail at which technologies have been taken up by the CDM, Table 2 shows the 
portion of the theoretical potential that is being captured by each technological category. The table 
shows that, in some sectors, such as agriculture and energy efficiency, very little of the identified 
potential has accessed the CDM. In other sectors, on the contrary, much larger emission reductions 
are being realized through the CDM than those identified in the theoretical studies, mainly in 
energy generation from renewable or other sources, or in reduction of industrial gases.  
 
While it appears that the CDM concentrates in specific technological niches, it is clear that the 
theoretical abatement studies did not uncover all the existing potential. The projections have been 
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too conservative, especially in energy generation, where many countries have experienced an 
unprecedented growth (for example the explosion of wind power capacity in China since 2006, 
which was not foreseen by the analysts) and where the potential for renewables is difficult to 
estimate. Again, because of this, the conclusions that are drawn remain on the cautious side of  
whether the CDM is exhausting the mitigation potential.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 and Tables 1 and 2 compare the CDM to theoretical abatement curves that were built on 
the basis of literature research, but resulted in some mismatch because the CDM uncovered 
significant emission reduction possibilities that had not been identified by the previous theoretical 
abatement potential studies. A more correct comparison would thus be between the CDM and a 
completed theoretical abatement that includes both the forecasts from the literature and the extra 
abatement (beyond the forecasts) achieved by the CDM. Such a comparison would imply that the 
CDM has captured even a smaller portion of the abatement potential than estimated in Tables 1 
and 2, strengthening our conclusions.  
 
An attempt to depict this situation appears as Figure 4, where, for the case of China, four 
abatement cost curves were compared: that of the CDM projects registered up to December 2009, 
which represents the lower range of annual abatement that will be achieved by the CDM; that of all 
CDM projects in the pipeline by December 2009, representing the higher range of abatement that 
will be achieved by the CDM under current rules up to 2012 (this is the same curve as in Figure 3); 
that of the incomplete theoretical abatement potential by the year 2010, gathered from the 
literature (same curve as in Figure 3); and that of a completed theoretical abatement potential that 
results from adding the extra abatement opportunities uncovered by the CDM to the previous 
curve. If this last curve is taken as being the real theoretical abatement potential in China, the CDM 
would capture 28% of the theoretical potential under the high-range CDM abatement scenario, 
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which shows again that the results presented above are conservative in terms of the relevance of the 
low-hanging fruit problem. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
6.4 Comparison with theoretical abatement curves: costs 
In all countries analysed, the cost range of the CDM projects (vertical axis in the abatement cost 
curves) covered only a fraction of the theoretical abatement cost range.  This is analyzed in more 
detail in Table 3. In China, South Korea and Thailand, it is observed that the CDM captures some 
very costly emission reduction options. These are solar energy projects, subsidized in the latter two 
countries through feed-in tariffs. In China and South Africa some CDM projects reach abatement 
costs of nearly $50-70, which is also above the market price for emission reductions. In Mexico and 
Argentina, finally, the CDM mainly stays below the $13 threshold, so that the CER primary price 
makes most projects attractive. From this analysis, it can be concluded that in Mexico and 
Argentina the CDM seems to be focusing almost exclusively on the cheaper projects, while in the 
other countries there is also some (albeit marginal) exploration of higher cost emission reduction 
opportunities. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In several theoretical GHG abatement cost studies consulted (Johnson et al., 2009; Wetzelaer et al., 
2007; Enkvist et al., 2007; Bakker et al., 2007; US EPA, 2006; World Bank, 2002; UNDP/GEF, 
1999; ADB, 1998a, 1998b), the estimated potential of GHG reduction options with net negative 
costs is significant. Such ‘no-regret’ reduction options seem to conflict with rational behaviour: if 
an investment entails negative costs, it is financially profitable, and this business opportunity 
should have been captured. The reasons for the existence of this negative-cost potential are market 
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imperfections leading to lack of knowledge about the reduction options, misaligned incentives, 
social preferences, a lack of priority, insufficient capital availability and differing definitions of cost 
(e.g. social versus financial cost). It is often suggested that in order to remove these market barriers, 
high transaction costs are incurred, which are normally not included in abatement cost studies.  
 
The CDM imposes further costs to these abatement options, especially to small-scale ones: 
monitoring methodologies need to be designed and approved; project design, validation, 
registration and verification of emission reductions need to be paid for; monitoring plans and 
equipment need to be put in place. It is thus not too surprising that the large reduction potential 
from energy efficiency and transport, typically with abatement costs below zero, is not being taken 
up by the CDM.  
 
The observation that many theoretically cheap abatement options remain on the table in 
developing countries reflects the limitations of the CDM for overcoming non-market barriers to 
these abatement options. From this point of view, it is argued that the CDM has grasped the cheap 
abatement options that have been easy to obtain, while mostly leaving alone the abatement options 
that are more difficult to implement in practice.  
 
 
7. Conclusions and limitations of the study 
An attempt to use empirical data to test the low-hanging fruit hypothesis regarding the CDM – the 
claim that it is using up the cheaper emission reduction options in its host countries, thereby 
leaving them without future opportunities for cost-effective emission reductions when they adopt 
climate change mitigation commitments - was presented. By comparing the portion of the 
emissions reduction potential in six countries captured so far by the CDM with the potential 
available according to several studies, it is concluded that the low-hanging fruit argument is weak. 
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It was found that the CDM is not yet taking up a large portion of the identified theoretical 
abatement potential in most of the countries assessed, with the exception of China where it reaches 
about 32%. In terms of costs, while most of the emissions reduction opportunities grasped by the 
CDM are below the average market price, there is still plenty of low-cost opportunities to be 
harvested. Finally, while Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM almost exclusively for 
harvesting the low-hanging fruit, more expensive projects are accessing it in the other countries 
analyzed (China, South Korea, Thailand and South Africa) . A more detailed study of why these 
more expensive projects are being captured could shed further light on how to direct the CDM for 
both promoting technologies that are usually difficult to access and encouraging learning effects, 
thereby creating new ‘low-hanging fruits’. Further, recognition of the transaction costs and non-
market barriers involved in the implementation of many theoretically cheap abatement options 
may explain why many of these options are still left untouched. 
 
Even with these results, if the CDM (or a similar offsetting mechanism) is expanded significantly, 
there is a risk that cheap abatement options may become scarce in the countries involved. 
Programmatic CDM, which is only just taking off, can open the door for projects in rarely covered 
sectors (e.g. households and small-scale renewables). Potential changes in the rules of the CDM, 
allowing for the inclusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS); nuclear energy; avoided 
deforestation; other land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects; and the abatement 
of GHGs currently not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, could also lead in this direction. The 
market mechanisms currently under discussion in the negotiations– sectoral crediting, or credited 
NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) – could also expand offsetting significantly. 
While these new approaches will only materialize if there is sufficient demand for emission 
reduction credits from countries with emission reduction targets, careful design is needed to keep 
positive incentives for mitigation in developing countries.  
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Finally, a note on the limitations of this study. While data on emission reduction costs and 
potentials was collected from as many sources as possible, the theoretical potential identified is 
quite conservative, as illustrated by the many emission reduction options that the CDM has 
captured without first being identified in the theoretical studies. This implies both that the MAC 
curves presented here are to be used with care, and that our result – that the CDM is not yet 
capturing a large portion of this potential – is robust. Further, cost data from CDM projects is 
likely to be biased downwards for costly technologies and upwards for cheap technologies. The 
reason for this bias is that CDM projects need to demonstrate that they are financially unattractive 
without the CDM revenues, but the input of CDM revenues make them attractive. The few, very 
expensive, projects found in the CDM acknowledged that they were not financially feasible, but 
were intended for demonstration purposes. Finally, even if this possible bias is disregarded, CDM 
cost information was mainly gathered from the six countries the study focuses on. This renders the 
project sample by technologies or project types quite small in some cases. Thus, it is likely that 
geographical and technological differences lead to more variability in terms of abatement costs 
within project types than is reflected here. Further effort in collecting data from more countries 
could lead to more detailed technological categories with more accurate cost data.  
 
Endnotes 
1. In the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries with mandatory emission reduction targets for 
the period 2008-2012 are listed in Annex B, thus being known as ‘Annex B countries’. Annex B 
is an update of the UNFCCC’s Annex I, which lists the countries that were members of the 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries 
with economies in transition. Under the UNFCCC, these countries agreed to reduce GHG 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Countries in both lists are the same, except for 
Belarus and Turkey which do not appear in Annex B. In this article, countries with emission 
reduction targets will frequently be referred to as ‘industrialized countries’, and countries 
without targets (‘non-Annex B countries’) as ‘developing countries’. As such, some rapidly 
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industrializing countries such as China, and some South-East Asian and oil exporting countries 
of the Gulf region, qualify as ‘developing countries’. 
2. See Narain and van’t Veld (2008) for a review of occasions when the low-hanging fruit issue was 
discussed in the Kyoto negotiations. 
3. Recent calculations suggest that China is now the largest CO2 emitter in the world, surpassing 
even the USA (MNP, 2008; IEA, 2010). However, per-capita emissions in this and other large 
developing countries are still very low in the global ranking. 
4. In order to be registered, CDM projects need to demonstrate that they would not have 
happened without support from the CDM (the additionality rule). Thus, if in country X there 
is a piece of legislation that mandates, for example, the use of energy saving lamps, then 
country X cannot propose a CDM project to replace incandescent bulbs with energy saving 
ones. The additionality rule discourages countries from passing climate-friendly legislation, 
because they do not want to lose the potential revenues from possible CDM projects. To avoid 
this perverse incentive, the CDM authorities created a new rule in November 2005, which 
states that climate-friendly policies passed after the year 2001 are not to be counted towards the 
additionality constraint of CDM projects. 
5. Each project has a standardized ‘Project Design Document’ (PDD), which is used throughout 
the registration process and is publicly available for analysis. 
6. In the CDM, the size of the project is determined either in terms of its output capacity (for 
renewable energy projects), the amount of energy consumption reduced (for energy efficiency 
projects), or the amount of emission reductions achieved (for all other projects) (CDM 
Rulebook, 2010). Projects considered to be small according to these criteria can use simplified 
baseline and monitoring methodologies, which include, among others, a simplified 
demonstration of additionality. 
7. In this definition, the savings in energy consumption or the cost of alternative investments are 
also considered as revenues, so that the incremental costs of emission reductions constitute our 
abatement costs. 
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8. Project developers have an incentive to manipulate their figures and try to show low revenues, 
so that the project appears financially unattractive, which is a prerequisite for being considered 
additional. 
9. 94% of the analysed projects are already registered under the CDM Executive Board of the 
UNFCCC. Projects at an earlier stage of the registration process were analysed only if no 
sufficient information was available from registered projects for a certain technology. In this 
case, care was taken that any requests for review were not related to the financial analysis of the 
project.  
10. Average over the last 3 months of 2009. 
11. It should be noted that performance in terms of actual generation of emission reductions differs 
between CDM project-types, with industrial gas projects clearly generating more reductions 
than initially projected, and methane reduction projects generating less. While taking this into 
account affects our estimation of CDM size for specific technological and cost categories 
(shown in Tables 2 and 3), it does not affect the main conclusion that the low-hanging fruit 
argument is weak. Calculations using issuance-corrected CER volumes are available on request.  
12. The consultancy McKinsey has prepared a MAC curve for Israel, but the full report is only 
available in Hebrew, and the executive summary in English does not provide sufficient 
information for our purposes. Further, it focuses on the year 2030, which is too far away in the 
future to compare with the CDM now. 
13. According to the monthly newsletter ‘CDM Highlights’ issued by GTZ, CDM credit prices 
fluctuated between USD 12 and USD 33 in the spot market during 2008 and 2009, with an 
average of USD 20.7. The World Bank’s State and Trends of the Carbon Market (Kossoy and 
Ambrosi, 2010) cites an average price of $12.7 per CER in the primary market during 2009. 
While it is difficult to choose between primary and secondary prices as the correct threshold for 
defining a cheap abatement option (as project developers in different countries have different 
CER selling strategies), the conclusion remains unchanged if the $12.7 or the $20.7 average 
price is used. The conclusion also remains unchanged if it is considered that CDM transaction 
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costs should be added to the pure abatement costs before assessing the financial attractiveness of 
the project. 
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Figure 1: Estimated abatement costs of CDM projects (USD/tCO2e), by technology 
 
 
Sources: CDM projects’ Project Design Documents, own calculations. For HFC projects: Harnisch and 
Hendricks, 2000; UNEP TEAP, 2002; Jimenez, 2005. The figures in parentheses show the sample size for 
each technology. 
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Figure 2: GHG abatement cost curve for the CDM pipeline 
 
 
(a): China 
 
(b): South Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Argentina, South Africa, Israel 
 
Sources: Cost data from PDDs, potentials from URC (2010), own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
 
 
Note: The potential abatement curves are built on the basis of data from the studies listed in Appendix 2. 
They do not include emission reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been 
previously forecast in the mentioned studies.  
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Figure 4: China: Comparing actual CDM, potential CDM, theoretical potential and 
completed theoretical potential 
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Table 1: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM 
Country Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
China 31.9% of 2010 potential 21.7% of 2020 potential  
South Korea 18.4% of 2010 potential 
Mexico 2.4% of 2010 potential 
South Africa 1.9% of 2010 potential 
Thailand 9.4% of 2010 potential 
Argentina 17.7% of 2010 potential 
 
Note: Percentages based on the incomplete theoretical abatement potential (without including emission 
reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been previously forecast). 
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Table 2: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM, by technologies 
Technological category 
Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
China South Korea Mexico South Africa Thailand Argentina 
Agriculture 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% - - -
Coal mine methane 15.9% - 25.7% 0.0% - -
Energy efficiency in 
households / commercial 
buildings 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -
Energy efficiency in 
industry 0.3% 0.2% 3.4% 0.3% 0.0% 2.2%
Energy efficiency in own 
generation 19.0% 0.0% 0.4% infinite 20.2% 75.4%
Thermal power 27.7% 0.0% 0.1% 2.9% 0.0% -
Forestry 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2%
Fugitive emissions 3.2% 0.0% 2.2% infinite - -
Industrial gases 73.5% 218.6% 171.9% infinite infinite infinite
Renewable energy 678.2% infinite 4.4% 4.5% infinite 0.9%
Other energy 880.7% 6.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 35.0%
Waste 7.6% 9.4% 38.1% 64.4% infinite 48.5%
Transport Infinite 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Note: Percentages based on the incomplete theoretical abatement potential (without including emission 
reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been previously forecast). “Infinite” 
denotes a category, for which the theoretical abatement studies did not identify any emission reduction 
potential, but the CDM did nonetheless. “-“ denotes a category where no emission reduction opportunities 
were identified, neither in the CDM, nor in the theoretical studies.  
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Table 3: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM, by cost categories 
Cost category 
Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
China South Korea Mexico South Africa Thailand Argentina 
< 0 USD/tCO2e 3.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 8.6% 18.9% 
0 - 10 USD/tCO2e 27.9% 82.6% 11.0% 2.5% 10.2% 30.2%
10 - 20 USD/tCO2e 148.5% 288.7% 0.2% 0.3% infinite 55.8%
20 - 30 USD/tCO2e 89.4% 0.0% 137.8% 0.0% - 3.7%
30 - 40 USD/tCO2e 126.9% 2.6% - - - -
40 - 50 USD/tCO2e 0.0% 0.0% - 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%
50 - 60 USD/tCO2e 2392.1% 0.0% 0.0% - - 0.2%
60 - 70 USD/tCO2e 0.2% 65.8% - infinite 0.0% -
70 - 80 USD/tCO2e 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% - - 0.0%
> 80 USD/tCO2e 2.7% 13.8% 0.0% 0.0% infinite 0.9%
Note: Percentages based on the incomplete theoretical abatement potential (without including emission 
reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been previously forecast). “Infinite” 
denotes a category, for which the theoretical abatement studies did not identify any emission reduction 
potential, but the CDM did nonetheless. “-“ denotes a category where no emission reduction opportunities 
were identified, neither in the CDM, nor in the theoretical studies.  
Cost categories were defined by matching technologies used in the CDM with technologies included in the 
theoretical studies, and taking the abatement costs estimated in the theoretical studies. For technologies 
appearing in the CDM and not in the theoretical studies, our estimation of abatement costs was taken.  
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Appendix 1: Standardization of discount rates 
 
Country Standardized discount rate 
Argentina 11% 
Brazil 15% 
China 8% 
Ecuador 12% 
India 11% 
Indonesia 17% 
Israel 10% 
Jordan 8% 
Kenya 15% 
Malaysia 10% 
Mexico 12% 
Moldova 10% 
Morocco 10% 
Mozambique 13% 
Peru 12% 
Philippines 12% 
Qatar 10% 
Rwanda 12% 
South Africa 12% 
South Korea 7% 
Thailand 10% 
United Arab Emirates 8% 
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Appendix 2: Sources of data for theoretical MAC curves 
 
Country Data sources 
Argentina National CDM/JI Strategy Studies (NSS) Program, 
1999; UNDP/GEF, 1999 
China Yamaguchi, 2003; Yamaguchi, 2005; US EPA, 2006; 
Wetzelaer et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2008 
Mexico Sheinbaum and Masera, 2000; US EPA, 2006; 
Bocanegra, 2009; Johnson et al., 2009 
South Africa World Bank, 2002; Winkler et al., 2008 
South Korea Asian Development Bank, 1998a; Roh, 2006a; Roh, 
2006b; Roh and Kang, 2006; US EPA, 2006 
Thailand Asian Development Bank, 1998b; Shrestha and 
Bhattacharya, 2002 
 
 
 
